UPDATED: Kirk Cousins and his Coming King-Sized Contract
by Steve Thomas
Update, July 16, 2016: Since we initially released the original “Kirk Cousins and his Coming King-Sized Contract” column back at the beginning of the offseason, several events have occurred that somewhat dramatically effect a hypothetical contract between the Redskins and Kirk Cousins: (1) Cousins signed the exclusive franchise tender, (2) Houston signed Brock Osweiller, (3) the Colts extended Andrew Luck’s contract, and (4) the Redskins and Kirk Cousins did not reach an agreement by the July 15, 2016, deadline. Because Cousins and the team did not reach an agreement, he will play the 2016 season under the one year franchise tag and be paid a fully guaranteed $19,953,000. The Redskins have the right to place another franchise tag on him for the 2017 at a cost of between $23,000,000 – $24,000,000; alternatively, the parties could reach a long term agreement next offseason. The other option, of course, is that the Redskins could choose to let Cousins sign with another team.
In light of these developments, I thought it would be productive to update the charts, the analysis of the data, and the conclusions regarding his potential contract that I original released in my original column. This will provide a snapshot of the parameters of a potential long-term contract may lie once we reach the 2017 offseason.
So, for purposes of this update, I will operate under the assumption that the Redskins will continue to be pleased with Kirk and want to sign him to a market value long term contract. Clearly, whether this is actually true will depend on his performance in the upcoming season. Some fans are under the assumption and the hope that Kirk essentially be given a blank check by the Redskins front office. I do not believe this is true or will ever be true. In my opinion, the front office will try to obtain an agreement that will not hamstring the team’s salary cap for years to come.
As was the situation in my original column, this is a tedious, data-driven project and some of you will not want to grind through to the conclusion. So, here’s the executive summary: what I think could be a reasonable contract between the Redskins and Kirk Cousins is 5 years, approximately $105M total value, $40M guaranteed, average annual value between $20M – $22M structured for a cap hit of approximately $20M, but with the Redskins being able to terminate the contract in year 3 without a cap penalty. The details of how I arrived at those numbers are below.
Long Term Contract Options1
We can take a look at some contract and performance data for quarterbacks around the league in order to be able to get a feel for what a long-term contract between the Redskins and Cousins might look like. First up is a look at the NFL’s elite franchise quarterbacks.
The “Elite”
This chart shows the details of the contracts of the ten NFL quarterbacks who are generally considered to be the “elite” franchise quarterbacks for whom every team is looking:
| Name | 1st yr of Contract2 | No. years | Total Value | Guaranteed $3 | % Guaranteed4 | Ave. Ann. Salary5 | Cap hits6 | Dead Money7 | % of Cap8 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brees, D. (NO) | 2012 | 5 | $100M | $40M | 40 | $20M | ’12: $10.4M ’13: $17.4M ’14: $18.4M ’15: $23.8M ’16: $30M |
’12: $40M ’13: $29.6M ‘14: $22.225M ’15: $33.8M ’16: $10M |
’12: 8.75 ’13: 13.95 ’14: 13.89 ’15: 16.65 ’16: 19.48 |
| Brady, Tom (NE) | 2015 | 3 | $27M | $24M (injury) |
89 | $9M | ’15: $14M ’16: $15M ’17: $16M |
’15: $18M ’16: $12M ’17: $6M |
’15: 9.91 ’16: 9.74 |
| Manning, E. (NYG) | 2016 | 4 | $84M | $54M init; additional $11M in ‘17 |
64 / 77 | $21M | ’16: $24.2M ’17: $19.7M ’18: $22.2M ’19: $23.2M |
’16: $42.3M ’17: $18.6M ’18: $12.4M ’19: $6.2M |
’16: 15.71 |
| Palmer, C. (AZ) | 2015 | 3 (4th yr voids) |
$49.5M | $20.5M | 41 | $16.5M | ’15: $7.375M ’16: $17.075M ’17: $20.675M |
’15: $20.5M ’16: $13.125M ’17: $8.75M |
’15: 4.94 ’16: 11.09 |
| Rivers, P. (SD) | 2016 | 4 | $83.25M | $65M | 78 | $20.8125M | ’16: $21M ’17: $18.5M ’18: $19.5M ’19: $20.5M |
’16: $18M ’17: $13.5M ’18: $9M ’19: $4.5M |
’16: 13.64 |
| Rodgers, A. (GB) | 2015 | 5 | $110M | $54M | 49 | $22M | ’15: $18.25M ’16: $19.25M ’17: $20.3M ’18: $20.9M ’19: $21.1M |
’15: $29.95M ’16: $13.3M ’17: $6.65M ’18: $0 ’19: $0 |
’15: 12.87 ’16: 12.50 |
| Roethlisberger, B. (PIT) | 2016 | 4 | $87.4M | $31M | 35 | $21.85M | ’16: $23.95M ’17: $18.2M ’18: $23.2M ’19: $23.2M |
’16: $24.8M ’17: $18.6M ’18: $12.4M ’19: $6.2M |
’16: 15.55 |
| Romo, T. (DAL) | 2014 | 6 | $108M | $55M | 51 | $18M | ’14: $11.773M ’15: $14.973M ’16: $20.835M ’17: $24.7M ’18: $25.2M ’19: $23.7M |
’14: $49.181M ’15: $45.908M ’16: $31.935M ’17: $19.6M ’18: $8.9M ’19: $3.2M |
’14: 9.06 ’15: 10.86 ’16: 13.53 |
| Wilson, R. (SEA) | 2016 | 4 | $87.6M | $61.542M | 70 | $21.9M | ’16: $18.542M ’17: $18.8M ’18: $21.7M ’19: $23.2M |
’16: $24.8M ’17: $18.6M ’18: $12.4M ’19: $6.2M |
’16: 12.04 |
| Averages | — | 4 | $81.86M | $45M | 56.6 | $19.01M | $19.82M | $17.66M | 12.45 |
You will see that I did not include Andrew Luck in this “elite” category, despite his newly-inked massive contract. This is strictly a matter of personal opinion, as I do not believe that his performance to date merits inclusion, although he could easily reach that point someday soon. His contract is accounted for in both the “good” and “2010/11/12” sections below. I removed the now retired Peyton Manning from the chart as previously published.
The final row in this chart shows the average number of years, total contract amount, total guaranteed dollars, percent guaranteed, average annual value, average cap hit, average amount of dead money per year, and average percentage cap hit for all of the “elite” quarterbacks. Now, some of these player have contracts that are outliers for players of their stature – Tom Brady, for example, has a much smaller contract in every area. Furthermore, the average data points for total contract value is not a particularly useful or insightful statistic due to the variance in the length of contract between the players in this category. The average dead money value suffers from the same problem as does the average total contract value, in that the variance is extremely large. Looking at the most important numbers that can be compared across the NFL, the average elite franchise quarterback has a contract of 4 years in length, guarantees approximately 56.6 percent of the total value, has an average annual salary of $19.01M, has a an average cap hit of $19.82M per year, and average of $17.66M in dead money, and takes 12.45 percent of the salary cap per year. Seven of these nine contracts are structured so that the cap hit exceeds the amount of dead money by year 2. The Brees and Romo contracts are the only ones that get to year 4 before hitting the cap hit / dead money break point. This is important because it means that the team can terminate the contract without being assigned an amount against the salary cap that is actually greater than the amount they are saving by terminating the contract. You will note that the variance for the dead money numbers is extremely wide: many of these contract are structured so that the first two years have extremely large amounts of dead money, with the number falling off dramatically in later years.
This chart contains the major career statistics for these same 10 “elite” quarterbacks:
| Name | Yrs in NFL | Career QB Rating | Career Comp % | Career th % | Career Int % | No. Pro Bowls | No. All Pro/MVP | No. Playoff Gms | No. SB started/won |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brees, D. (NO) | 15 | 95.8 | 66.4 | 5.3 | 2.5 | 9 | 4/0 | 11 | 1/1 |
| Brady, Tom (NE) | 16 | 96.4 | 63.6 | 5.5 | 1.9 | 11 | 3/2 | 29 | 6/4 |
| Manning, E. (NYG) | 12 | 83.5 | 59.3 | 4.7 | 3.2 | 3 | 0 / 0 | 11 | 2/2 |
| Palmer, C. (AZ) | 13 | 88.1 | 62.7 | 4.8 | 3 | 3 | 1/1 | 2 | 0/0 |
| Rivers, P. (SD) | 12 | 95.5 | 64.8 | 5.3 | 2.5 | 5 | 0 / 0 | 9 | 0/0 |
| Rodgers, A. (GB) | 11 | 104.1 | 65.1 | 6.4 | 1.6 | 5 | 3/2 | 13 | 1/1 |
| Roethlisberger, B. (PIT) | 12 | 94 | 64.1 | 5 | 2.7 | 4 | 0 / 0 | 16 | 3/2 |
| Romo, T. (DAL) | 13 | 97.1 | 65.3 | 5.7 | 2.7 | 4 | 1/1 | 6 | 0/0 |
| Wilson, R. (SEA) | 4 | 101.8 | 64.7 | 6.1 | 2 | 3 | 0 / 0 | 9 | 2/1 |
| Averages | 12 | 95.1 | 64 | 5.4 | 2.5 | 5.2 | 1.3 / 0.4 | 11.8 | 1.7/1.2 |
The data shows that average statistical performance for an “elite” quarterback is an average of 12.0 years in the NFL (with Russell Wilson bringing down the average), a career quarterback rating of 95.1, completion percentage of 64.0, 5.4 touchdown percentage, 2.5 interception percentage, with a significant number of playoff games; furthermore, most of these players have won at least one Super Bowl and have been selected to at least one Pro Bowl, with a few having won MVP awards. This is the profile of the truly elite NFL quarterback.
The “Good”
The following chart shows the contract data for the quarterbacks who are roughly considered to be in the next tier down from the NFL’s group of elite quarterbacks – this is the group of “good”, but not “great” players who can lead a team and are borderline franchise quarterbacks, for lack of a better term:
| Name | 1st yr of Contract | No. years | Total Value | Guaranteed $ | % Guaranteed | Ave. Ann. Salary | Cap hits | Dead Money | % of Cap. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cutler, J. (CHI) | 2014 | 7 | $126M | $54M | 43 | $18.1M | ’14: $18.5M ’15: $16.5M ’16: $17M ’17: $16M ’18: $17M ’19: $20M ’20: $21.7M |
’14: $38M ’15: $29.5M ’16: $13M ’17: $2M ’18: $1M ’19: $0 ’20: $0 |
’14: 14.01 ’15: 11.66 ’16: 11.04 |
| Dalton, A. (CIN) | 2015 | 6 | $96M | $17M | 18 | $16M | ’15: $9.6M ’16: $13.1M ’17: $15.7M ’18: $16.3M ’19: $16.2M ’20: $17.7M |
’15: $13.8M ’16: $7.2M ’17: $4.8M ’18: $2.4M ’19: $0 ’20: $0 |
’15: 6.67 ’16: 8.51 |
| Flacco, J. (BAL) | 2013 | 6 | $126M | $29M | 23 | $20.1M | ’13: $6.8M ’14: $14.8M ’15: $14.55M ’16: $28.55M ’17: $31.15M ’18: $24.75M |
’13: $29M ’14: $38.2M ’15: $36.4M ’16: $25.85M ’17: $15.3M ’18: $4.75M |
’13: 5.25 ’14: 11.8 ’15: 10.3 ’16: 18.54 |
| Luck, A. (IND) | 2017 | 5 | $122.97M | $44M | 38 | $24.594M | ’17: $19.4M ’18: $24.4M ’19: $27.525M ’20: $28.4M ’21: $21M |
’17: $25.6M ’18: $19.2M ’19: $12.8M ’20: $6.4M ’21: $0 |
‘17: 14.71 ’18: 23.19 |
| Ryan, M. (ATL) | 2014 | 5 | $103.75M | $42M | 40 | $20.75M | ’14: $17.5M ’15: $19.5M ’16: $23.75M ’17: $23.75M ’18: $21.65M |
’14: $41.5M ’15: $33.9M ’16: 18.4M ’17: $10.4M ’18: $2.4M |
’14: 13.11 ’15: 14.35 ’16: 15.42 |
| Smith, A. (KC) | 2015 | 4 | $68M | $45M | 66 | $17M | ’15: $15.6M ’16: $17.8M ’17: $16.9M ’18: $20.6M |
’15: $40.5M ’16: $24.9M ’17: $7.2M ’18: $3.6M |
’15: 11.03 ’16: 11.56 |
| Stafford, M. (DET) |
2015 | 3 | $53M | $41.5M | 78 | $17.67M | ’15: $17.72125M ’16: $22.5M ’17: $22M |
’15: $27.2213M ’16: $11M ’17: $5.5M |
’15: 12.37 ’16: 14.61 |
| Averages | — | 5.1 | $99.39M | $38.93M | 43.7 | $19.17M | $19.33M | $15.33M | 12.67 |
These quarterbacks have contract numbers that are, on average, still large burdens on the salary caps for their respective teams, for several seasons: average length of 5.1 years (brought down by Matthew Stafford’s three year deal), 43.7 percent guaranteed, $19.17M average annual salary, average cap hit of $19.33M with $15.33 in dead money, and an average of 12.67 percent of cap space. One of these contracts (Flacco) does not cross the cap hit / dead money break point until year 4, whereas four of them reach that point in the third year and two (Dalton and Stafford) hit that mark in year two.
This chart contains the major career stats for these same 10 “good” quarterbacks:
| Name | Yrs in NFL | Career QB Rating | Career Comp % | Career th % | Career Int % | No. Pro Bowls | No. All Pro/MVP | No. Playoff Gms | No. of Super Bowls started/won |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cutler, J. (CHI) | 10 | 86 | 62 | 4.7 | 3.2 | 1 | 0 / 0 | 2 | 0/0 |
| Dalton, A. (CIN) | 5 | 88.4 | 62.3 | 5 | 2.9 | 2 | 0 / 0 | 4 | 0/0 |
| Flacco, J. (BAL) | 8 | 84.7 | 60.9 | 4 | 2.5 | 0 | 0 / 0 | 15 | 1/1 |
| Luck, A. (IND) | 4 | 85 | 58.1 | 4.8 | 2.6 | 3 | 0 / 0 | 6 | 0/0 |
| Ryan, M. (ATL) | 8 | 90.9 | 64.3 | 4.5 | 2.4 | 3 | 0 / 0 | 5 | 0/0 |
| Smith, A. (KC) | 11 | 84.5 | 61 | 3.9 | 2.3 | 1 | 0 / 0 | 4 | 0/09 |
| Stafford, M. (DET) |
7 | 85.8 | 60.9 | 4.4 | 2.7 | 1 | 0 / 0 | 2 | 0/0 |
| Average | 7.6 | 86.5 | 61.4 | 4.5 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 0/0 | 5.4 | .1 / .1 |
Let’s be honest about who these quarterbacks are: they are quarterbacks who their respective franchises hoped are or would become franchise quarterbacks, but had enough question marks to result in a twinge of doubt. For example, Jay Cutler and Joe Flacco are clearly paid like quarterbacks in the “elite” group, but have not performed in an equivalent manner. This group of quarterbacks hold an average career rating of 86.5, completion percentage of 61.4, 4.5 touchdown percentage, and a career interception percentage of 2.7. Only one of these quarterbacks, Joe Flacco (who, it must be said, considers himself elite, and he may be correct; these categories I created are not set in stone), has played in more than 5 playoff games or played in a Super Bowl.
Quarterback Class of 2010/2011/2012
Finally, this next chart shows the contract data for those quarterbacks from the 2010, 2011, and 2012 draft classes who have already received a second contract from the team that drafted them and stayed with that team:
| Name | 1st yr of Contract | No. years | Total Value | Guaranteed $ | % Guaranteed | Ave. Ann. Salary | Cap hits | Dead Money | % of Cap. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dalton, A. (CIN) | 2015 | 6 | $96M | $17M | 18 | $16M | ’15: $9.6M ’16: $13.1M ’17: $15.7M ’18: $16.3M ’19: $16.2M ’20: $17.7M |
’15: $13.8M ’16: $7.2M ’17: $4.8M ’18: $2.4M ’19: $0 ’20: $0 |
’15: 6.67 ’16: 8.51 |
| Kapernick, C. (SF) | 2015 | 6 | $114M | $61M | 54 | $19M | ’15: $15.266M ’16: $15.891M ’17: $19.366M ’18: $18.866M ’19: $21.2M ’20: $23.4M |
’15: $20.663M ’16: $7.397M ’17: $4.932M ’18: $2.466M ’19: $0 ’20: $0 |
’15: 11.16 ’16: 10.32 |
| Luck, A. (IND) | 201710 | 5 | $122.97M | $44M11 | 38 | $24.594M | ’17: $19.4M ’18: $24.4M ’19: $27.525M ’20: $28.4M ’21: $21M |
’17: $25.6M ’18: $19.2M ’19: $12.8M ’20: $6.4M ’21: $0 |
‘17: 14.71 ’18: 23.19 |
| Newton, C. (CAR) | 2016 | 5 | $103.8M | $60M | 58 | $20.76M | ’16: $19.5M ’17: $20.167M ’18: $21.5M ’19: $23.2M ’20: $21.1M |
’16: $18M ’17: $ 13.5M ’18: $9M ’19: $4.5M ’20: $2M |
’16: 12.66 |
| Osweiller, B. (DEN)12 | 2016 | 4 | $72M | $37M | 51 | $18M | ’16: $12M ’17: $19M ’18: $21M ’19: $20M |
’16: $37M ’17: $25M ’18: $6M ’19: $3M |
’17: 7.63 ’18: 11.95 |
| Tannehill, R. (MIA) | 2017 | 4 | $77M | $45M | 58 | $19.25M | ’17: $20.3M ’18: $19.8M ’19: $21.05M ’20: $19.522M |
’17: $6.9M ’18: $4.6M ’19: $2.3M ’20: $0 |
— |
| Wilson, R. (SEA) | 2016 | 4 | $87.6M | $61.542M | 70 | $21.9M | ’16: $18.542M ’17: $18.8M ’18: $21.7M ’19: $23.2M |
’16: $24.8M ’17: $18.6M ’18: $12.4M ’19: $6.2M |
’16: 12.04 |
| Averages | — | 4.9 | $96.2M | $46.51M | 49.6 | $19.93M | $19.52M | $9.45M | 11.88 |
I have included both Andrew Luck and Brock Osweiller in this category. The first thing that is immediately obvious is that no 2010 quarterbacks are included – this is because 2010 was a bad draft year for quarterbacks, with Sam Bradford and Washington’s own Colt McCoy probably being the best of that group. None are still with, and are starting for, the teams that drafted them and none of them are solid, long-term NFL starters. You may disagree with my exclusion of Bradford despite his switching teams; however, my opinion is that he is not worthy of inclusion with these other players. Regardless, the contract profile for this group is a five year contract with 51.6 percent guaranteed, $19.38M average annual salary, $16.13M average cap hit, $7.46M in dead money, with an 10.23 percent of the cap being taken. Importantly, all five of these contracts give the teams an “out” in year 2, because the salary cap hit exceeds the dead money by year 2 in all five contracts.
This chart contains the major career data for these same 2010/2011/2012 quarterbacks:
| Name | Yrs in NFL | Gms Played | Career QB Rating | Career Comp % | Career th % | Career Int % | No. Pro Bowls | No. All Pro/MVP | No. Playoff Gms | No. SB started/won |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dalton, A. (CIN) | 5 | 81 | 88.4 | 62.3 | 5 | 2.9 | 2 | 0 / 0 | 4 | 0/0 |
| Kaepernick, C. (SF) | 5 | 63 | 88.4 | 59.9 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 0 | 0 / 0 | 6 | 1/0 |
| Luck, A. (IND) | 5 | 61 | 85 | 58.1 | 4.8 | 2.6 | 3 | 0 / 0 | 6 | 0/0 |
| Newton, C. (CAR) | 5 | 81 | 88.2 | 59.5 | 4.8 | 2.6 | 3 | 1/1 | 3 | 0/0 |
| Osweiller, B. (DEN) | 4 | 21 | 86 | 61.3 | 3.6 | 2 | 0 | 0 / 0 | 0 | 0/0 |
| Tannehill, R. (MIA) | 4 | 64 | 85.2 | 61.9 | 3.9 | 2.4 | 0 | 0 / 0 | 0 | 0/0 |
| Wilson, R. (SEA) | 4 | 73 | 101.8 | 64.7 | 6.1 | 2 | 3 | 0 / 0 | 9 | 2/1 |
| Averages | 4.6 | 63.4 | 89 | 61.1 | 4.6 | 2.3 | 1.6 | .1 / .1 | 4 | .4/.3 |
The profile of a quarterback who received a second contract from his team is as follows: 72.4 games played, career quarterback rating of 90.1 (with Russell Wilson being the outlier who brought up the average; all 4 of the others have ratings in the upper 80s); completion percentage of 61.7, touchdown percentage of 4.8, and interception percentage of 2.4.
Kirk Cousins Comparables
These are Kirk Cousins’ career stats as compared to the average stats for each of the three groups of quarterbacks in the same categories as shown in the data above:
| Name | Yrs in NFL | Gms Played | Career QB Rating | Career Comp % | Career th % | Career Int % | No. Pro Bowls | No. All Pro/MVP | No. Playoff Gms | No. SB started/won |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cousins, K. (WAS) | 4 | 32 | 91.3 | 65.2 | 4.9 | 3.2 | 0 | 0 / 0 | 2 | 0/0 |
| Average “elite” | 12 | — | 95.1 | 64 | 5.4 | 2.5 | 5.2 | 1.3 / 0.4 | 11.8 | 1.7 / 1.2 |
| Average “good” | 7.6 | — | 86.5 | 61.4 | 4.5 | 2.7 | 1.6 | 0 / 0 | 5.4 | .1 / .1 |
| Average 2010/11/12 quarterbacks | 4.6 | 63.4 | 89 | 61.1 | 4.6 | 2.3 | 1.6 | .1 / .1 | 4 | .4 / .3 |
The first thing that jumps out of this chart is that Kirk Cousins does not really compare to the group of “elite” quarterbacks in any way: experience, quarterback rating, touchdown and interception percentages, pro bowls, playoffs, or Super Bowls; similarly, while his career numbers compare to the “good” group, his number of NFL service years, playoff and pro bowl experience does not. He does, however, compare favorably to both the “good” and “2010/2011/2012” groups in most stats except two: number of games played and interception percentage (which, as we all know, took a dramatic turn for the better this year). It could be fairly said, then, based on this data, that if Cousins had posted these career numbers over two more seasons worth of games played, he without question would be due to receive a contract that compared favorably with or even exceeded the average 2010/2011/2012, even despite his interception percentage being the highest of any quarterback in this group. At it stands, however, at the end of the 2015 season, his sample size of performance was significantly less than his peers in this group, and this likely stood at the heart of the debate between the Redskins’ contract negotiators and Cousins’ agent. Regarding Cousins’ number of games played, it is noteworthy that (1) Andy Dalton and Cam Newton are both 2011 draftees, one year earlier than Cousins, and (2) these players signed their deals at fewer games than are listed in this chart. Nonetheless, it is inarguable that Cousins has played far fewer games than anyone on this list; however, the gap is not as pronounced as is reflected here. Further, another year of health for Cousins in 2016 would put him at 48 games played (not including any additional playoff games)
Kirk Cousins Contract
This chart compares the average “elite quarterback” contract to the average “good quarterback” contract and the average “2010/11/12 quarterback” contract:
| QB Group | No. years | Total Value | Guaranteed $ | % Guaranteed | Ave. Ann. Salary | Cap hits | Dead Money | % of Cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Elite | 4 | $81.86M | $45M | 56.6 | $19.01M | $19.82M | $17.66M | 12.45 |
| Good | 5.1 | $99.39M | $38.93M | 43.7 | $19.17M | $19.33M | $15.33M | 12.67 |
| 11/12/10 | 4.9 | $96.2M | $46.51M | 49.6 | $19.93M | $19.52M | $9.45M | 11.88 |
The important differences in the average contracts for each of these three categories are apparent: while the average annual salaries are fairly standardized, the average cap hits descend from the “elite” group to the “good” group, but then ascends slightly between the “good” group and the “2010/2011/2012” group, as does the dead money and the average percentage of the cap. In particular, the average dead money for the “2010/2011/2012” group is significantly less. While the dead money calculation has the widest statistical variance of any of the contract data by far, making the average a less useful statistic in general, one could also infer that teams structured those contracts to be much more team friendly, and they can get away with doing so due to the relative youth of those players. Cousins should be placed within the “2010/2011/2012” group on the basis of his career numbers. The following facts, at a minimum, will effect a long term contract between the Redskins and Kirk Cousins:
● the precedent established by virtue of Cousins playing under the franchise tag in 2016;
● the reduction in risk to team due to Cousins’ one additional year of growth in the upcoming 2016 season (again, assuming Cousins does not regress and instead continues to improve);
● his history of performance when compared to the other quarterbacks in that group; and
● the natural annual increases in the salary cap.
The data shows that fans should expect Cousins to receive (assuming an agreement is reached and the team does not franchise tag him again in 2017) a five year contract with a large total value, likely in the $100 – 110M range, average annual value between $20M – $22M but with cap hits exceeding the dead money in year 3, average cap usage of between 12 and 13 percent per year. Based on the existing contracts analyzed here, it appears to be extremely unlikely that the Redskins will agree to any contract in which the cap hit exceeds the dead money in year 3 and beyond, despite the chatter in the media that Cousins and his agent are looking for “security” and a “commitment”. The Romo and Flacco contracts, both of which had dead money exceeding the cap hit into year 4, have both proven to be extremely burdensome to their respective teams. The Romo contract, in particular, has been redone more than once since its original execution just to make it remotely palatable to the cowboys. This current version of Redskins management has proven to be shrewd when it comes to contracts and cap management. Therefore, I believe his contract may look like this: 5 years, $105M total value, $40M guaranteed at signing, with additional money being guaranteed in year 2 and 3. The deal will likely be structured for a cap hit of approximately $20M, but with the Redskins able to terminate the contract in year 3. If you see a contract that has higher cap usage or guaranteed dollar amount, it is likely that either the Redskins (1) went deep into the playoffs as a result of Cousins’ performance, or (2) management simply places a higher value on Kirk Cousins than his performance and experience and NFL contract data indicates and therefore intentionally overpaid.
What are your thoughts?
1. All raw contractual data in the tables in this column is courtesy of www.spotrac.com. All player statistics are courtesy of www.pro-football-reference.com.
2. Some of these contracts are actually extensions of the player’s prior contract rather than an entirely new contract. The years listed in this column are therefore sometimes actually the first year of an extension rather than a new contract. The difference is unimportant here.
3. In NFL contracts, the “Guaranteed Money” is the amount of the total contract value that the player is guaranteed to receive even if the team terminates the contract early. It is primarily accomplished through payment of a variety of bonuses. A description of the various bonuses is beyond the scope of what is relevant to this discussion.
4. The number represents the total guaranteed money divided by the total contract value.
5. The “Average Annual Salary” includes base salary and bonuses; it is the total contract value divided by the length of the contract.
6. The “Cap Hit” is the amount assigned by the NFL to the salary cap for that league year. It is a combination of the annual salary and the pro-rated portion of the various player bonuses that are assigned to the salary cap for that year pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
7. The “Dead Money” is the amount of money obligated to the salary cap for that league year in the event the player’s contract is terminated in that league year. The calculation of the Dead Money has to do with the amount of bonus money given to the player under the player contract. The Collective Bargaining Agreement requires that the bonus money be prorated over the life of the contract for salary cap purposes.
8. Cap Hit % for 2016 is estimated because the final salary cap number has not been determined yet.
9. Alex Smith was with the 49ers in the 2013 Super Bowl, but Colin Kaepernick played the game; thus, Smith’s number is 0.
10. Luck is playing 2016 under the CBA-provided team option for 1st rd picks. The actual extension begins in 2017, and is thus reflected that way here.
11. $44M is the amount guaranteed at signing. Luck has additional money become guaranteed each season through 2021, but because that money was not guaranteed as of signing, it is not shown here as guaranteed money. Certainly, any Cousins contract would have this same feature to one extent or the other.
12. Brock Osweiller received a contract from Houston, not the team who drafted him, but his contract is relevant to this discussion and is therefore included here.